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This paper is about re-thinking gesture in order to reckon with its material and haptic nature, 
especially in the current multitouch technology environment. This re-thinking of gesture 
returns to the principle of indexicality found in Peirce’s material semiotics, and develops this 
principle through the work of Gilles Deleuze around hand-eye relationships. Drawing on the 
work of Jürgen Streek, we propose and discuss the notion of the tangible gesture, in the 
context of mathematical explorations of young children with a multitouch iPad environment 
designed to promote counting on and with the fingers. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the context of education research, vast amounts of video studies focus on student and 
teacher use of gesture in classrooms, but this work tends to code and sort gestures insofar as 
they are representations of thinking. These studies tend to divorce the motoric hand from the 
feeling swipes and swishes of fingers. Material semiotic approaches to the study of 
interaction, on the other hand, consider gesture less as representations and more in terms of 
the material effects they achieve (Roth, 2001). Our goal in this paper is to take up this 
approach to study the gestures used in new digital media, and to unpack the implications for 
understanding mathematics learning in relation to new media. We begin by locating our work 
in relation to current semiotic ways of conceiving of gestures, as used in the field of gesture 
studies and adopted in mathematics education research. We then point to different ways of 
conceiving the role of gestures that have emerged principally from the work of the 
philosophers Gilles Deleuze, pointing to new forms of tangible gesturing that may operate in 
fundamentally new ways. Thus we aim to expand the definition of gesture formulated by 
Kendon (2004) so as to address the changing ways in which hand and media interact.  
We argue that new media offers—and will always offer—new ways to rethink the relationship 
between body and gesture. By focusing on a burgeoning new technology, we can show how 
our understanding of gesture depends on our bodily configurations and, as Rotman (2008) and 
others have suggested, on our current technological prosthetic extensions. If inventive 
gestures are always at the threshold, then taxonomies of gestures are limited by their 
assumptions about where the body ends. What we find in the literature on mathematics and 
gesture is a concerted effort to code these gestures without adequate attention to how new 
gesturing habits emerge as the body itself is reconfigured. In other words, we cannot take for 
granted what a body can do. As new media emerge, so do new gestures, and these together 
actualize the contours of a newly assembled body and a newly assembled set of concepts. 
Thus we examine the ways in which new media gestures demand a reconsideration of how the 
capacities of sense organs—eyes, hands, ears—are coordinated provisionally and in response 
to material interfaces. In order to illustrate how these new media gestures operate, we draw on 
research involving the use of a multitouch application TouchCounts. 
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THE INDEXICAL GESTURE AND INSCRIPTION 
Researchers such as McNeill (1992) have identified different categories of gestures (icon, 
metaphoric, deictic and beat) so as to distinguish different relationships between gesture and 
speech. McNeill has drawn on Peirce’s semiotics in which signs (icons, indices and symbols) 
differ in terms of the nature of the relationships between the signifying sign and the signified. 
According to Peirce, icons operate according to likeness or resemblance between the signifier 
and the signified, like the image of a man or woman on a bathroom door. Iconic gestures are 
also described in terms of their resemblance with events or objects. If iconic signs become 
conventional codes within particular cultures, they may become symbols, which have an 
arbitrary relationship with that to which they refer. The third category, indices, emphasizes 
the material link between signifier and signified. Unlike icons and symbols, indexical signs 
are bound to the context in important ways—they “show something about things, on account 
of their being physically connected with them” (Peirce, 1894/1998, p. 5). As in the case of 
smoke billowing from a chimney indicating that the fireplace is in use, the smoke indexes the 
fire. In other words, smoke is produced by and contiguous with the fire.  
What is distinctive about the index is that it is a sign that is materially linked or coupled to “its 
object”. According to Peirce (1932), an index “refers to its object not so much because of any 
similarity or analogy with it, (…) as because it is in dynamical (including spatial) connection 
both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses or memory of the person 
for whom it serves as a sign, on the other” (2.305). For Peirce, the pointing aspect of indexical 
signs was only a consequence of their essential material link or connection to their object. 
Visual indexical signs, for instance, like the smoke example above, capture this far better, as 
they entail a visual trace or mark that evokes or refers to that which formed the trace or mark. 
This latter indexical dimension is usually not emphasized in the semiotic study of 
mathematical activity, since we tend to focus on the completed trace and dislocate it from the 
labour that produced it. Such habits of focus have resulted in our neglect of how the activity 
of the body and various other material encounters factor in mathematical activity.  
Pierce’s diagrammatic approach to signs—and his focus on the visual—has been superseded 
in the research literature by an emphasis on gesture as part of “the human capacity for 
language” and the study of gesture as “language in action” (Rossini, 2012). However, 
research that codes gesture only in terms of linguistic potential tends to overlook the 
physicality of the hand movement of gesture, except insofar as such movement contributes to 
or obscures linguistic meaning. As Streeck (2009) indicates, “it is common to treat gesture as 
a medium of expression, which meets both informational and pragmatic or social-interactional 
needs, but whose “manuality” is accidental and irrelevant” (p. 39). He defines gesture: 
… not as a code or symbolic system or (part of) language, but as a constantly evolving set 
of largely improvised, heterogeneous, partly conventional, partly idiosyncratic, and partly 
culture-specific, partly universal practices of using the hands to produce situated 
understandings. (p.5)  
Thus he studies gesture for how it is “communicative action of the hands” with emphasis on 
the term action (p.4). This focus on action allows Streeck to study gesture for how it couples 
with and intervenes in the material world in non-representational ways. Researchers often 
distinguish between hand movements in the air and hand movements that make graphic 
marks, where the former is deemed a gesture and the latter an act of inscription. However, 
such distinctions become fuzzy when we follow Streeck and study the movement of the hand 
across and through media, where ‘media’ can be more or less receptive of trace or mark. In 
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other words, all hand movements traverse and incorporate media. We see a trace in certain 
media, and not in others, but since the logic of new media is to break with current conventions 
of perception, this distinction is provisional. As gesture recognition technology evolves, hand 
movements in the air become productive of various kinds of traces.   
In the case study we discuss below, the hand actually operates very close to the surface of a 
screen: pointing to objects on the screen by tapping them; sliding objects along on the screen 
so as to leave visual and aural traces of the finger’s path; pinching objects together in order to 
make new ones. These gestures of pinching and flicking and pointing both communicate 
meaning and inscribe marks. In this paper, we discuss an application in which the gesture 
plays an even more central role in the mathematical activity. Briefly, there are two worlds: 
enumerating and operating. The former features an ordinal model of numbers and the latter a 
cardinal model of numbers. In the Enumerating World, each finger tap produces a yellow 
disc. Tapping the screen four times consecutively will produce three discs, each numbered 1, 
2, 3, 4, respectively, and three sounds “one”, “two”, “three”, “four”. The discs fall off the 
bottom of the screen unless gravity is turned off, in which case they remain on the screen, or 
unless the finger tap is made above the horizontal line, which acts as a ‘shelf’ on which the 
discs rest (figure 1b) (video: http://tinyurl.com/q8lpzrc). In the Operating World, tapping the 
screen with four fingers simultaneously produces a ‘herd’ with the numeral 4 on it, as well as 
four smaller discs (see figure 1c). Multiple herds can be combined by using a pinching gesture 
(4 and 1 are being combined in figure 1c). The resulting herd will be labelled with the sum, 
and this sum is said aloud. A herd can be partitioned into two herds by using a splitting 
gesture (video: http://tinyurl.com/omancvf).  
       
Figure 1a: The enumerating world () and the operating world (+); (b) Ordinal numbers 
falling off the shelf; (c) Herds of different cardinalities. 
Rather than study gestures as iconic or symbolic representations of some concept, we examine 
gestures for how they function as indexical, material actions. By focusing on the indexical, we 
can study gestures as materially coupled, generative devices, rather than only as forms of 
representation.  
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAND AND EYE 
The philosopher Gilles Deleuze (2003) points to the complex and changing relationship 
between hand and eye, directing our attention to how particular senses outrank others in 
particular situations. He examines how the eye and the hand compete for control of meaning, 
where confusion or even contradiction is resolved when one sense dominates the other. He 
identifies four relationships between hand and eye, and he names them: the digital, manual, 
tactile and haptic. The first term designates situations where the eye dominates the hand, 
while the next two terms track an increasingly more dominant hand in relation to the eye, and 
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the last term a more ‘equal’ contribution of the two. 
The tapping of the finger on a surface or screen corresponds to the digital aspect because the 
eye is dominant as it determines where and when the tapping should occur. The hand is 
subordinated to the eye: “the hand is reduced to the finger, that is, it intervenes only in order 
to choose the units that correspond to pure visual forms” (p. 124). But screen gestures also 
include various dynamic gestures, such as sweeping. Through these, the hand becomes tactile. 
The space is not entirely depleted of dynamic potential, and it is these potential dynamic 
dimensions that are enlisted. The flicking gesture might provide a good example here of the 
tactile category in that there is a virtual referent of speed involved because flicking must begin 
by touching an object and then quickly swooshing it higher or lower, where the quickness of 
the swoosh determines the speed at which the object changes.  
Deleuze suggests that the hand can revolt against this optic regime in acts of creative art. He 
refers to manual relationships as ones in which the hand takes charge, where there is 
“movement without rest, which the eye can barely follow and which dismantles the optical” 
(p. 124). In the manual relationship, the eye may not be able to direct the hand, being 
somehow refused access to what the hand now controls. Maybe the eyes are closed, or maybe 
the action performed by the hand takes precedent over the visual aspects of the objects on 
which it is performed. The eye and hand are still somewhat individuated as organs. It is in the 
haptic relationship that it becomes difficult to distinguish the eye from the hand: “there is no 
longer a strict subordination in either direction, but when sight discovers in itself a specific 
function of touch that is uniquely its own, distinct from its optical function” (p. 125). In a 
haptic relationship, the eye begins to see with its hand. 
TWO CASE STUDIES 
In the next section, we discuss a case study of children working with TouchCounts. We 
examine two excerpts, each focusing on an encounter between a child, a teacher and an iPad. 
Indexical Gestures and Rhythm 
In this example, a five-year-old girl named Katy is interacting with TouchCounts for the first 
time. Without prompting, Katy’s hand approaches the screen, and her finger touches the top 
of it and slides down to the bottom. A yellow disc appears under her finger with the numeral 
‘1’ on it and the sound ‘one’ is made. The index finger moves back to the top of the screen, 
slowly swimming downwards. A chorus of ‘two’ comes both from her mouth and the iPad. 
This happens repeatedly, although sometimes only the iPad can be heard announcing the new 
numbered disc while Katy’s lips move in synchrony (Figure 2a). The appearance of ‘10’ on 
the tenth yellow disc attracts attention, perhaps because of its double digits, and Katy bends 
over to look closely. Now only the iPad counts the numbers (Figure 2b).  
       
Figure 2(a) Katy swiping; (b) Following the yellow disc; (c) Tapping while looking up. 
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After ‘seventeen’, several fingers fall on the screen at once, and then ‘twenty-one’ is heard. 
This produces a pause, and Katy’s lips spread into a smile. All but the index finger are tucked 
away, as the rhythmic tapping continues along with the chorus of named numbers. At 
‘twenty-seven’ Katy looks up, no longer watching the screen (see Figure 2c), and continues 
swiping and saying numbers. This continues until a finger accidentally lands on Reset. 
Grasping with Multiple Fingers and Subitising 
As seen above when multiple fingers alighting on the screen resulted in the jump from 
“seventeen” to “twenty-one”, there can be a significant difference between one-finger and 
multi-finger interactions. Indeed, in TouchCounts, there is a possibility of asking children to 
produce a given number “all-at-once”, which involves them placing a required number of 
fingers on the screen simultaneously, rather than sequentially tapping a finger.  
    
Figure 3: (a) Using fingers to counting up to seven; (b) Making seven on the fingers. 
In this example, Cameron (four years old) was asked to make seven all-at-once. We want to 
draw attention to how the hand and eye, as well as the ear, work together in what happens. He 
first takes his hand out, unfurls his fingers one by one as he counts them softly to himself (see 
Figure 3a). Then he looks at what his fingers have formed, palms up, and then turns his hands 
over to place the outstretched fingers on the screen. But he accidentally touches the screen in 
more then seven spots so that TouchCounts says “eight”. When asked if he wants to do it 
again, he nods and his hands immediately take on the same seven-finger gesture he had made 
before (without first having to count out the fingers nor look at them to validate), and he 
carefully places his fingers on the screen (Figure 3b), thus producing “seven”. 
DISCUSSION 
Fingers can serve as both a physical extension of what Rotman (1987) calls the ‘one-who-
counts’ (p. 27) as well as the thing-to-be-counted: fingers are thus simultaneously subject and 
object, both of the person and of the world (Alibali & diRosso, 1999). This is what makes the 
finger actions of Katy and Cameron so interesting; the act of counting with TouchCounts 
fuses this duality and in so doing changes the relationship between hand and eye (and ear). 
Katy’s hand actions change over the course of the episode, not only in the particular muscular 
form they take, first sliding down the screen as if lingering on the yellow discs to produce or 
partake in their falling off the screen, and then tapping impetuously so that each new touching 
of the screen follows the end of the sounds of the voiced numerical. The swiping gesture 
seems more exploratory while the tapping gesture seems to concatenate into a unit the touch-
see-hear bundle of sensations involved in making a new disc-numeral-name. As Streeck 
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writes, tapping is also “characteristic of ritualized behavior” (p. 76), which suggests that Katy 
has moved from exploration to practice. In both the swiping and the tapping, the finger can be 
seen as making an indexical gesture, with the trace being both visible and audible, not to 
mention tangible for Katy. Although the initial movement and touch of her finger is what 
produces the disc, it is the disc that determines the swiping movement of her finger. Indeed, 
both her finger and her eyes follow the yellow disc as it heads down the screen. In 
shepherding the numbered disc off the screen, Katy is able to see when it’s time to lift her 
finger and start making a new disc. But with the tapping, the eyes attend to the numerical sign 
on the disc—indeed, when “10” appears, Katy notices the change from the previous one-digit 
numerals. In this sense, the eye and the finger do very similar things when swiping; the visible 
trace is followed closely by Katy’s eyes as the swiping takes place, so that the hand is 
subordinated to the watchful eye in Deleuze’s digital sense. With the tapping, the hand seems 
less subordinated, as the eye is only interested when a novel situation comes up, like a double 
digit. When Katy looks up, the hand is no longer subordinate at all and the relationship is a 
manual one. Her fingers do the seeing and touching as they are repetitively summoned on the 
screen.  
But of course, there is more than the eye and hand involved in this situation. The ear and 
voice feature importantly as well. Indeed, while the voice is subordinate to the touch (it only 
speaks while Katy taps), Katy’s hand is also subordinate to the ear in that the ear judges the 
moment of the next tap. And the ear is disrupted by the hand, when several fingers touch the 
screen at once, causing the voice to jump from “seventeen” to “twenty-one.” The eye, which 
was about to drift off, must return to survey the situation; the hand returns to its single digit 
tapping. The importance of the aural and the vocal is interesting in terms of the counting 
activity at play. Indeed, the ritual origins of counting are oral in nature, and counting with 
young children is often undertaken as the learning of a song that one memorizes and chants. 
The involvement of the hand in this otherwise oral event provides a visual and tangible trace 
of the count, while also associating each counted number with a single swipe or tap.  
One might question whether Katy’s actions on the screen, which we might think of as touch-
pointing, can really be thought of as gestures. In discussing the importance of the pointing 
gesture in enabling people “to make discriminations, and highlight, emphasize, and interpret 
the present world and orient each other to it” (p. 59), Streeck argues that such gestures (and 
indeed all gestures) emerge from the touching and handling of things—the tracing (or other 
“data-gathering devices” such as caressing, probing, cupping) of objects that allows one to 
discover its texture and temperature. When the hand has done its exploring, which fulfills an 
epistemic function in gathering information, it may then be lifted off the object and inclined to 
repeat the same movements ‘in the air’: “the hands’ data-gathering methods are used as the 
basis for gestural communication” (p. 69). Streeck identifies such gestures as being 
communicative. In this sense, Katy’s touch-pointing becomes a gesture once she lifts her hand 
from the screen to do her tapping. 
Distinguishing hand movements that explore from ones that communicate is problematic 
though. As Streeck writes, exploratory actions can become communicative when they are 
made visible to others, who may join in the action or infer tactile properties. If we look at 
Katy’s swiping and tapping gestures, we might say that they are both exploratory, with the 
swiping gestures involving prolonged tactile contact that enables her to discover what would 
happen when her finger touches the glass—that a yellow disc would appear, with a numeral 
on it; that the disc would move down the screen; that the iPad would speak the number’s 
name aloud, and that this could all be repeated as often as she wished. But Katy’s swiping 
361
and, later, her tapping, are also communicative inasmuch as they tell TouchCounts what to do 
and say. The same might be said for clicks of the mouse or key presses of the keyboard, with 
the difference that the touchscreen is acted upon by direct hand motions. Instead of 
disentangling the tracing from the pointing (the exploration from the communication), we 
suggest that re-assembling them into an indexical enables us to see how Katy’s hand 
movements can tap into the potentiality of the body by reconfiguring the relationships 
between sensations of touch, sight and sound that are at play. This potentiality mobilizes new 
mathematical meanings as Katy uses her fingers to count on, to count with and to count out 
one by one and indefinitely. Streeck recognizes that hand-gestures “enable translations 
between the senses” (p. 70) as tactile discoveries provide visual information for interlocutors. 
With Katy though, the tactile discoveries provide visual and auditory information to herself. 
She is her own interlocutor.  
In the case of Cameron, multiple fingers engage with the screen. Whereas the first gesture in 
Figure 3a is digital because the hand is subordinated to the eye, which carefully tracks the 
number of fingers being raised, the final gesture in 3b has become haptic in the sense that 
neither the eye nor the hand is subordinate—the eye is seeing the “seven-ness” in its 
multiplicity, which the simultaneous touch has actualized. While the eye had condoned the 
initial gesture, the ear announced that its trace on the screen was unexpected. It was not the 
right sound, but it was just one word, rather than a succession of one, two, three, four, five, 
six, seven, eight. The eye accepted the gesture and the ear prompted Cameron to revise the 
precision of his hand’s action so that in the next attempt the hand is placed more carefully on 
the screen to prevent any other parts of the hand from touching—or being touched by—it. 
Here it seems to be the hand’s responsibility to mould itself in a particular shape so that only 
fingertips touch. The eye watches but the hand is in charge. Throughout, the relevant trace is 
the aural one, as Cameron does not stop to count the number of discs on the screen.  
The gesture of seven-fingers-lifted that Cameron makes immediately becomes a 
communicative version of an exploratory act: first it successfully tells TouchCounts how to 
say “seven” without saying the preceding numbers—the gesture annotates the act of having 
lifted seven fingers up one by one; it also enables Cameron to see/produce the cardinal seven 
so that seven becomes a reified version of the sequential counting out of the fingers. As with 
Katy, Cameron becomes his own interlocutor and his hands, eyes and ears are reassembled 
into a new configuration through which counting becomes count—that is, through which the 
slow, ordered sequence of finger lifting becomes a sudden flash of the hand. Finally, 
Cameron’s gesture communicates to the children around him, who now only need to mimic 
his flash of the hand in order to make their own sevens—and, later, their own sixes and eights 
and most happily, tens. For them, the gestures may initially act as signs, but once they place 
their fingers on the screen, those gestures become indexical in simultaneously pointing and 
tracing. Again, as with Katy, we cannot say that the epistemic hand-action has merely 
culminated in a communicative gesture, in part because the hands have been coupled with a 
certain spatial arrangement of yellow discs as well as a singular announcing of the count. 
CONCLUSION 
In tracing the evolution of the hand and its role in human development, Streeck shows how 
the hand’s actions in the world, which enable fundamental actions such as eating and making, 
become communicative. He argues that hand-gestures cannot be taken only as components of 
a language system, which are cast apart from the material world, and used only to 
communicate about the world. Rather, they are of the world, and part of how we feel the 
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world around us. This perspective requires us to see the moving hand as “environmentally 
coupled” (Goodwin, 2007), that is, as inextricable from the things it touches and engages 
with. But while Streeck implies a vector from the exploratory hand action to the 
communicative hand-gesture, our case studies reveal how the exploratory hand frees itself 
from the optic regime and invents meaning as much as it communicates it. This new kind of 
gesture is possible in large part because of the feedback mechanism of digital technologies, 
which can talk, push and show back. With the touchscreen interface, and particularly the 
multitouch actions, the hand is involved in a process of communicating that is also a process 
of inventing and interacting.  
In both of the examples we presented, we have tried to show that the gestures made by the 
children in TouchCounts had a significant indexical nature in part because they not only 
involved some kind of pointing (with one finger or more) but they left a trace that is both 
visible and audible. The trace is important in drawing attention to the material engagement of 
the children’s gestures. They obviously arise out of movements of the hand, but they also 
result in material reconfigurations that can give rise to new movements of the hand. In 
discussing the effect of new digital technologies in disciplines such as mathematics, Rotman 
has written about the future cultural neoteny in which speech would “become reconfigured (as 
it was once before when transformed by alphabetic writing), re-mediated and transfigured into 
a more mobile, expressive, and affective apparatus by nascent gesturo-haptic recourses 
emerging from the technologies of motion capture” (2008, p. 49). In other words, the word 
and perhaps even the strictly communicative gesture cedes the way to the gesture-haptic so 
that even pre-school children can count ‘on their hands’ to 100. 
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